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In this chapter I discuss connections between machine learning and the philosophy
of science. First I consider the relationship between the two disciplines. There is a
clear analogy between hypothesischoice in science and model selection in machine
learning. While this analogy has been invoked to argue that the two disciplines are
essentially doing the same thing and should merge, I maintain that the disciplines
are distinct but related and that there is a dynamic interaction operating between
the two: a series of mutually beneﬁcial interactions that changes over time. I will
introduce some particularly fruitful interactions, in particular the consequences of
automated scientiﬁc discovery for the debate on inductivism versus falsiﬁcationism
in the philosophyof science, and the importance of philosophicalwork on Bayesian
epistemology and causality for contemporarymachine learning. I will close by sug-
gesting the locus of a possible future interaction: evidence integration.
1 Introduction
Since its genesis in the mid 1990s, data mining has been thought of as encompass-
ing two tasks: using data to test some pre-determined hypothesis, or using data to
determine the hypothesisin the ﬁrst place. The full automation of both these tasks –
hypothesising and then testing – leads to what is known as automated discovery
or machine learning. When such methods are applied to science, we have what is
called automated scientiﬁc discovery or scientiﬁc machine learning. In this chapter,
we shall consider the relationship between the philosophy of science and machine
learning, keeping automated scientiﬁc discovery particularly in mind.
Section 2 offers a brief introduction to the philosophy of science. In Sect.3 it is
suggested thatthe philosophyof science and machinelearningadmit mutuallyfruit-
ful interactions because of an analogy between hypothesis choice in the philosophy
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of science and model selection in machine learning. An example of the beneﬁt of
machine learning for the philosophy of science is provided by the importance of
work on automated scientiﬁc discovery for the debate between inductivism and fal-
siﬁcationism in the philosophyof science (Sect.4). On the other hand, the inﬂuence
of philosophical work on Bayesianism and causality provides an example of the
beneﬁts of the philosophy of science for machine learning (Sect.5). Section6 hy-
pothesises that evidence integration may become the locus of the further fruitful
interaction between the two ﬁelds.
2 What is the Philosophy of Science?
In the quest to improve our understanding of science, three ﬁelds of enquiry stand
out: history of science, sociology of science, and philosophy of science. Histo-
rians of science study the development of science, key scientists and key ideas.
Sociologists of science study social constraints on scientiﬁc activity–e.g., how
power struggles impact on the progress of science. Philosophers of science study
the concepts of science and normative constraints on scientiﬁc activity. Questions
of interest to philosophers of science include:
Demarcation: What demarcatesscience fromnon-science?One view is that empir-
ical testability is a necessary condition for a theory to count as scientiﬁc.
Unity: To what extent is science a uniﬁed or uniﬁable ﬁeld of enquiry? Some take
physics to be fundamental and the elements of other sciences to be reducible to
those of physics. Others argue that science is a hotch-potch of rather unrelated the-
ories, or that high-level complexity is not reducible to low-level entities and their
arrangement.
Realism: Are the claims of science true? To what extent are we justiﬁed in believ-
ing contemporary scientiﬁc theories? Realists hold that scientiﬁc theories aim to
describe an independent reality and that science gradually gets better at describing
that reality. On the other hand, instrumentalists hold that science is an instrument
for making predictions and technological advances and that there is no reason to
take its claims literally, or – if they are taken at face value – there are no groundsfor
believing them.
Explanation: What is it to give a scientiﬁc explanation of some phenomena? One
view is that explaining is the act of pointing to the physical mechanism that is
responsible for the phenomena. Another is that explanation is subsumption under
some kind of regularity or law.
Conﬁrmation: How does evidence conﬁrm a scientiﬁc theory? Some hold that ev-
idence conﬁrms a hypothesis just when it raises the probability of the hypothesis.
Others take conﬁrmation to be a more complicated relation, or not a binary relation
at all but rather to do with coherence with other beliefs.The Philosophy of Science and its relation to Machine Learning 79
Scientiﬁc Method: How are the goals of science achieved? What is the best way of
discovering causal relationships? Can one justify induction? While many maintain
that in principle one can automate science, others hold that scientiﬁc discoveryis an
essentially human, intuitive activity.
Concepts of the Sciences: How should one interpret the probabilities of quantum
mechanics? Does natural selection operate at the level of the individual, the pop-
ulation or the gene? Each science has its particular conceptual questions; even the
interpretation of many general concepts – such as probability and causality – re-
mains unresolved.
3 Hypothesis Choice and Model Selection
There is a clear link between the philosophyof science on the one hand and the area
of machine learning and data mining on the other. This link is based aroundan anal-
ogy between hypothesis choice in science and model selection in machine learning.
The task of determining a scientiﬁc hypothesis on the basis of current evidence is
much like the task of determining a model on the basis of given data. Moreover,
the task of evaluating the resulting scientiﬁc hypothesis is much like the task of
evaluating the chosen model. Finally, the task of deciding which evidence to collect
next (which experiments and observations to perform) seems to be similar across
science and machine learning. Apparently, then, scientiﬁc theorising and computa-
tional modeling are but two applications of a more general form of reasoning.
How is this general form of reasoning best characterised? It is sometimes called
abductive inference or abduction, a notion introduced by C.S. Peirce. But this
nomenclature is a mistake: the form of reasoning alluded to here is more general
than abduction. Abduction is the particular logic of moving from observed phe-
nomena to an explanation of those phenomena. Science and machine learning are
interested in the broader, iterative process of moving from evidence to theory to
new evidence to new theory and so on. (This broader process was sometimes called
“induction” by Peirce, though “induction” is normally used instead to refer to the
process of moving from the observation of a feature holding in each member of a
sample to the conclusion that the feature holds of unobserved members of the pop-
ulation from which the sample is drawn.) Moreover, explanation is just one use of
hypotheses in science and models in machine learning; hypotheses and models are
also used for other forms of inference such as prediction. In fact, while explanation
is often the principal target in science, machine learning tends to be more interested
in prediction. When explanation is the focus, one is theorising; when prediction
is the focus, the process is better described as modeling. Clearly, then, the general
form of reasoning encompasses both theorising and modeling. This general form of
reasoningis sometimes called discovery. But that is not righteither:the form of rea-
soning under consideration here is narrower than discovery. “Discovery” applies to
ﬁnding out new particular facts as well as to new generalities, but we are interested
purely in generalities here. In want of a better name, we shall call this general form
of reasoning systematising, and take it to encompass theorising and modeling.80 J. Williamson
Granting, then, that hypothesischoice in science and modelselection in machine
learning are two kinds of systematising, there are a variety of possible views as to
the relationship between the philosophy of science and machine learning.
One might think that since the philosophy of science and machine learning are
both concerned with systematising, they are essentially the same discipline, and
hence some kind of mergerseems sensible [1]. This positionis problematic,though.
As we saw in Sect.2, the philosophyof science is not only concernedwith the study
of systematising, but also with a variety of other topics. Hence the philosophy of
science can at best be said to intersect with machinelearning.Moreover,evenwhere
they intersect the aims of the two ﬁelds are rather different: e.g., the philosophy of
science is primarily interested in explanation and hence theorising, while the area
of machine learning and data mining is primarily interested in prediction and hence
modeling. Perhaps automated scientiﬁc discovery is one area where the aims of
machine learning and the philosophy of science coincide. In which case automated
scientiﬁc discovery is the locus of intersection between the philosophy of science
and machine learning. But this rather narrow intersection falls far short of the claim
that the two disciplines are the same.
More plausibly, then, the philosophy of science and machine learning are not
essentially one, but neverthelessthey do admit interesting connections[2,189;3,4].
In [4], I argue that the two ﬁelds admit a dynamic interaction. There is a dynamic
interactionbetweentwoﬁelds if thereisa connectionbetweenthemwhichleadsto a
mutually beneﬁcial exchange of ideas, the direction of transfer of ideas between the
two ﬁelds changes over time, and the ﬁelds remain autonomous [5]. Here, we shall
take a lookat two beneﬁcialpointsofinteraction:the lessons of automatedscientiﬁc
discovery for the study of scientiﬁc method (Sect.4) and the inﬂuence of work on
Bayesian epistemology and probabilistic causality on machine learning (Sect.5).
4 Inductivism Versus Falsiﬁcationism
Scientiﬁc method is an important topic in the philosophy of science. How do scien-
tists make discoveries? How should they make discoveries?
One view, commonly called inductivism and advocated by Bacon [6], is that
science should proceed by ﬁrst making a large number of observations and then
extracting laws via a procedure that is in principle open to automation. An oppos-
ing position, called falsiﬁcationism and held by popper [7], is that the scientist ﬁrst
conjectures in a way that cannot be automated and then tests this conjecture by ob-
serving and experimenting to see whether or not the predictions of the conjecture
are borne out, rejecting the conjecture if not.
While examples from the history of science have tended to support falsiﬁcation-
ism over inductivism, the successes of automated scientiﬁc discovery suggest that
inductivism remains a plausible position [8]. The approach of machine learning is
to collect large numbers of observations in a dataset and then to automatically ex-
tract a predictive model from this dataset. In automated scientiﬁc discovery this
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as scientiﬁc laws. To the extent that such procedures are successful, inductivism
is successful. Gillies [8], Sect.2.6 cites the GOLEM inductive logic programming
system as an example of a machine learning procedure that successfully induced
scientiﬁc laws concerning protein folding; this success was achieved with the help
ofhumanswhoencodedbackgroundknowledge[8, Sect.3.4].Journalssuchas Data
Mining and Knowledge Discovery and the Journal of Computer-Aided Molecular
Design show that the inductive approach continues to produce advances. Moreover,
the investment of drug and agrochemical companies suggests that this line of re-
search promises to pay dividends. While the hope is that one day such companies
might “close the inductive loop” – i.e., automate the whole cyclic procedure of data
collection, hypothesis generation, further data collection, hypothesis reformulation
::: – the present reality is that machine successes are achieved in combination
with human expertise. The use by Dow AgroSciences of neural networks in the
development of the insecticide spinetoram offers a recent example of successful
human–machine collaboration [9]; spinetoram won the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 2008 Designing Greener Chemicals Award.
Perhaps human scientists proceed by applying falsiﬁcationism while machine
science is inductivist. Or perhaps falsiﬁcationism and inductivism are but differ-
ent approximations to a third view which better explicates scientiﬁc method. What
could this third view be? It is clear that human scientists base their conjectures on
a wide variety of different kinds of evidence, not just on a large number of homo-
geneous observations. (This – together with the fact that it can be hard for scientists
to pin-point all the sources of evidence for their claims and hard for them to say
exactly how their evidence informs their hypotheses – makes it hard to see how
hypothesis generation can be automated. It is natural to infer, with falsiﬁcationists,
that hypothesis generation can’t be automated, but such an inference may be too
quick.) On the other hand, most machine learning algorithms do take as input a
large number of homogenous observations; this supports inductivism, but with the
proviso that the successes of automated scientiﬁc discovery tend to be achieved in
concert with human scientists or knowledge engineers. Human input appears to be
important to fully utilise the range of evidence that is available. The third view of
scientiﬁc method, then, is that a theory is formulated on the basis of extensive ev-
idence (including background knowledge), but evidence which is often qualitative
and hard to elucidate. The theory is revised as new evidence is accrued, and this
new evidence tends to be accrued in a targeted way, by testing the current theory.
Can this third way be automated? Contemporary machine learning methods require
well-articulated quantitative evidence in the form of a dataset, but, as I suggest in
Sect.6, there is scope for relaxing this requirement and taking a fuller spectrum of
evidence into account.
In sum, while not everyone is convinced by the renaissance of inductivism [see,
e.g., 10], it is clear that automated scientiﬁc discovery has yielded some successes
and that these have sparked new life into the debate between inductivism and falsi-
ﬁcationism in the philosophy of science.82 J. Williamson
5 Bayesian Epistemology and Causality
Having looked at one way in which machine learning has had a beneﬁcial impact
on the philosophy of science, we now turn to the other direction: the impact of the
philosophy of science on machine learning.
Epistemologists are interested in a variety of questions concerning our attitudes
towards the truth of propositions.Some of these questions concernpropositionsthat
we already grant or endorse: e.g., do we know that 2 C 2 D 4? if so, why? how
should a committee aggregate the judgements of its individuals? Other questions
concern propositions that are somewhat speculative: should I accept that all politi-
cians are liars? to what extent should you believe that it will rain tomorrow?
Philosophers of science have been particularly interested in the latter question:
to what extent should one believe a proposition that is open to speculation? This
question is clearly relevant to scientiﬁc theorising, where we are interested in the
extenttowhichweshouldbelievecurrentscientiﬁctheories.Inthetwentiethcentury
philosophers of science developed and applied Bayesian epistemology to scientiﬁc
theorising. The ideas behind Bayesian epistemology are present in the writings of
some of the pioneers of probability theory – e.g., Jacob Bernoulli, Thomas Bayes –
but only in recent years has it widely caught on in philosophy and the sciences.
One can characterise contemporary Bayesian epistemology around the norms
that it posits:
Probability: The strengths of an agent’s beliefs should be representable by proba-
bilities. For example, the strength to which you believe it will rain tomorrowshould
be measurable by a number P.r/between 0 and 1 inclusive, and P.r/should equal
1   P.:r/,w h e r e:r is the proposition that it will not rain tomorrow.
Calibration: Thesedegreesofbeliefshouldbecalibratedwiththeagent’sevidence.
For example, if the agent knows just that between 60% and 70% of days like today
havebeenfollowedbyrain,she shouldbelieveitwillraintomorrowtodegreewithin
the interval Œ0:6;0:7 .
Equivocation: Degrees of belief should otherwise be as equivocal as possible. In
the above example, the agent should equivocate as far as possible between r and
:r, setting P.r/ D 0:6, the value in the interval [0.6, 0.7] that is closest to total
equivocation, PD.r/ D 0:5.
So-called subjective Bayesianism adopts the Probability norm and usually the
Calibration norm too. This yields a relatively weak prescription, where the extent
to which one should believe a proposition is largely left up to subjective choice. To
limit the scope for arbitrary shifts in degrees of belief, subjectivists often invoke a
further norm governing the updating of degrees of belief: the most common such
norm is Bayesian conditionalisation, which says that the agent’s new degree of be-
lief P 0.a/ in proposition a should be set to her old degree of belief in a conditional
on the new evidence e, P 0.a/ D P.aje/.
In contrast to subjective Bayesianism, Objective Bayesianism adopts all three of
the earlier norms – Probability, Calibration and Equivocation. If there are ﬁnitely
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out of simpler propositions), these three norms are usually cashed out using the
maximum entropy principle: an agent’s degrees of belief should be representable by
a probability function, from all those calibrated with evidence, that has maximum
entropy H.P/ D 
P
!2˝ P.!/logP.!/. (The maximum entropy probability
function is the function that is closest to the maximally equivocal probability func-
tion PD which gives the same probability PD.!/ D 1=2n to each conjunction
! 2 ˝ Df ˙a1 ^   ^˙ang of the basic propositionsa1;:::;a n or their negations,
where distance from one probability function to another is understood in terms of
cross entropy d.P;Q/ D
P
!2˝ P.!/logP.!/=Q.!/.) Since these three norms
impose rather strong constraints on degrees of belief, no further norm for updating
need be invoked[11]. The justiﬁcation of these normsand the relative merits of sub-
jectiveandobjectiveBayesianepistemologyaretopicsofsomedebateinphilosophy
[see, e.g., 12].
The development of Bayesian epistemology has had a profound impact on
machine learning [13]. The ﬁeld of machine learning arose out of research on
expert systems. It was quickly realised that when developing an expert system it
is important to model the various uncertainties that arise on account of incomplete
or inconclusive data. Thus the system MYCIN, which was developed in the 1970s
to diagnose bacterial infections, incorporated numerical values called “certainty
factors.” Certainty factors were used to measure the extent to which one ought to
believe certain propositions. Hence, one might think that Bayesian epistemology
should be applied here. In fact, the MYCIN procedure for handling certainty factors
was non-Bayesian, and MYCIN was criticised on account of its failing to follow
the normsof Bayesian epistemology.From the late 1970s, it was common to handle
uncertainty in expert systems using Bayesian methods. And, when the knowledge
bases of expert systems began to be learned automatically from data rather than
elicited from experts, Bayesian methods were adopted in the machine learning
community.
But Bayesian methods were rather computationally intractable in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, and consequently systems such as Prospector, which was de-
veloped in the second half of the 1970s for mineral prospecting, had to make
certain simplifying assumptions that were themselves questionable. Indeed con-
siderations of computational complexity were probably the single biggest limiting
factor for the application of Bayesian epistemology to expert systems and machine
learning.
It took a rather different stream of research to unleash the potential of Bayesian
epistemology in machine learning. This was research on causality and causal rea-
soning.In the early twentieth century,largely underthe sceptical inﬂuence of Mach,
Pearson and Russell, causal talk rather fell out of favour in the sciences. But it was
clear that while scientists were reluctant to talk the talk, they were still very much
walking the walk: associations between variables were being interpreted causally to
predictthe effectsof interventionsand to informpolicy.Consequently,philosophers
of science remained interested in questions about the nature of causality and how
one might best reason causally.84 J. Williamson
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Under the probabilistic view of causality, causal relationships are analysable
in terms of probabilistic relationships – more speciﬁcally in terms of patterns of
probabilistic dependence and independence [14]. Reichenbach, Good, Suppes and
Pearl, pioneers of the probabilistic approach, developedthe concept of a causal net.
A causal net is a diagrammatic representation of causes and effects – such as that
depicted in Fig.1 – which has probabilistic consequences via what is now known
as the Causal Markov Condition. This condition says that each variable in the net
is probabilistically independent of its non-effects, conditional on its direct causes.
If we complete a causal net by adding the probability distribution of each variable
conditional on its direct causes, the net sufﬁces to determine the joint probability
distribution over all the variables in the net. Since the probabilities in the net tend
to be interpreted as rational degrees of belief, and since the probabilities are of-
ten updated by Bayesian conditionalisation, a causal net is often called a causal
Bayesian net. If we drop the causal interpretation of the arrows in the graph, we
have what is known as a Bayesian net. The advantage of the causal interpretation is
that under this interpretation the Markov Condition appears quite plausible, at least
as a default constraint on degrees of belief [15].
Now, a causal Bayesian net – and more generally a Bayesian net – can permit
tractablehandlingof Bayesianprobabilities.Dependingonthe sparsity ofthe graph,
it can be computationally feasible to represent and reason with Bayesian proba-
bilities even where there are very many variables under consideration. This fact
completed the Bayesian breakthrough in expert systems and machine learning. By
building an expert system around a causal net, efﬁcient representation and calcu-
lation of degrees of belief were typically achievable. From the machine learning
perspective,if the space of modelsunderconsiderationis the space of Bayesian nets
of sufﬁciently sparse structure, then learning a model will permit efﬁcient inference
of appropriate degrees of belief. If the net is interpreted causally, we have what
might be considered the holy grail of science: a method for the machine learning of
causal relationships directly from data.
In sum, Bayesian epistemology offered a principled way of handling uncertainty
in expert systems and machine learning, and Bayesian net methods overcame many
of the ensuing computational hurdles. These lines of work had a huge impact: the
dominance of Bayesian methods – and Bayesian net methods in particular – in the
annual conferences on Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (UAI) from the 1980s
is testament to the pervasive inﬂuence of Bayesian epistemology and work on prob-
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6 Evidence Integration
We nowhavesomegroundsforthe claimthatthereisa dynamicinteractionbetween
machine learning and the philosophy of science: the achievements of automated
scientiﬁc discovery have reinvigorated the debate between inductivists and falsi-
ﬁcationists in the philosophy of science; on the other hand, work on Bayesian
epistemology and causality has given impetus to the handling of uncertainty in ma-
chine learning. No doubt the mutually supportive relationships between philosophy
of science and machine learning will continue. Here, we will brieﬂy consider one
potential point of interaction, namely the task of evidence integration.
The dominant paradigm in machine learning and data mining views the ma-
chine learning problem thus: given a dataset learn a (predictively accurate) model
that ﬁts (but does not overﬁt) the data. Clearly, this is an important problem and
progress made on this problem has led to enormous practical advances. However,
this problem formulation is rather over-simplistic in the increasingly evidence-rich
environment of our information age. Typically, our evidence is not made up of a
single dataset. Typically, we have a variety of datasets – of varying size and qual-
ity and with perhaps few variables in common – as well as a range of qualitative
evidence concerning measured and unmeasured variables of interest – evidence of
causal, logical, hierarchical and mereological relationships for instance. The ear-
lier problem formulation just doesn’t apply when our evidence is so multifarious.
The Principle of Total Evidence, which holds that one should base one’s beliefs and
judgements on all one’s available evidence, is a sound epistemological precept, and
one that is breached by the dominant paradigm.
The limitations of the earlier problem formulation are increasingly becoming
recognised in the machine-learning community. This recognition has led to a spate
of research on what might be called forecast aggregation: a variety of models, each
derived from a different dataset, are used to make predictions, and these separate
predictions are somehow aggregatedto yield an overall prediction. The aggregation
operation may involve simple averaging or more sophisticated statistical meta-
analysis methods.
Butforecastaggregationitselfhas severallimitations.First,it still falls foulofthe
Principle of Total Evidence: each model is based on a single dataset but qualitative
evidence tends to be ignored. (Not always: qualitative evidence about relationships
between the variables is sometimes invoked in the preprocessing of the datasets –
if the knowledge engineer sees that a variable in one dataset is a subcategory of a
variable in another dataset, these two variables might be uniﬁed in some way. But
this data grooming is typically done by hand. As datasets involve more and more
variables it is increasinglyimportant that qualitative evidence be respected as a part
ofthe automationprocess.)Second,itis unclearhowfar oneshouldtrustaggregated
forecasts when they are often generated by models that not only disagree but are
based on mutually inconsistentassumptions. Obviouslyin such cases at most one of
the mutuallyinconsistent models is true; surely it would be better to ﬁnd and use the
true model (if any) than to dilute its predictions with the forecasts of false models.
But this requires collecting new evidence rather than forecast aggregation. Third,86 J. Williamson
the general problem of judgement aggregation – of which forecast aggregation is
but a special case – is fraught with conceptual problems; indeed the literature on
judgement aggregation is replete with impossibility results, not with solutions [16].
In view of these problems,a better approachmightbe to constructa single model
whichis basedon theentiretyoftheavailableevidence– quantitativeandqualitative
– and to use that model for predictions. Combining evidence is often called knowl-
edgeintegration.However,availableevidencemaynotstrictly qualifyas knowledge
because it may, for reasons that are not evident, not all be true; hence evidence inte-
gration is better terminology.
Bayesian epistemology provides a very good way of creating a single model on
the basis of a wide variety of evidence. As discussed in Sect.5, the model in this
case is (a representation of) the probability function that captures degrees of be-
lief that are appropriate for an agent with the evidence in question. The evidence
is integrated via the Calibration norm: each item of evidence imposes constraints
that this probability function must satisfy. (Some kind of consistency maintenance
proceduremust of course be invokedif the evidenceitself is inconsistent.) A dataset
imposes the following kind of constraint: the agent’s probability function, when
restricted to the variables of that dataset, should match (ﬁt but not overﬁt) the distri-
bution of the dataset, as far as other evidence permits. Qualitative evidence imposes
another kind of equality constraint, as follows. A relation R is an inﬂuence rela-
tion if learning of a new variable that does not stand in relation R to (i.e., does
not inﬂuence) the current variables does not provide grounds for changing one’s
degrees of belief concerning the current variables. Arguably causal, logical, hier-
archical and mereological relationships are inﬂuence relations. Hence, evidence of
such relationships imposes equality constraints of the form: the agent’s probabil-
ity function, when restricted to variables that are closed under inﬂuence, should
match the probability function that the agent would have adopted were she only
to have had evidence concerning that subset of variables, as far as other evidence
permits. Hence, both quantitative and qualitative evidence impose certain equality
constraints on degrees of belief. See [15]a n d[ 17] for the details and motivation
behind this kind of approach.
In sum, evidence integration has greater potential than forecast aggregation to
circumvent the limited applicability of the current machine learning paradigm.
Bayesian epistemology is strikingly well-suited to the problem of evidence inte-
gration. Hence, there is scope for another fruitful interaction between philosophyof
science and machine learning.
Example: Cancer Prognosis
As an illustration of the kind of approach to evidence integration that Bayesian
epistemology offers, we shall consider an application of objective Bayesian epis-
temology to integrating evidence for breast cancer prognosis. This application is
described in detail in [18].The Philosophy of Science and its relation to Machine Learning 87
When a patient has breast cancer and has had surgery to remove the cancer it
is incumbent on the relevant medical practitioners to make an appropriate onward
treatmentdecision.Broadlyspeaking,moreeffectivetreatmentsaremoreaggressive
in the sense that they have harsher side effects. Such treatments are only warranted
to the extent that the cancer is likely to recur without them. The more strongly the
medical practitioner believes the cancer will recur, the more aggressive the treat-
ment that will be instigated. It is important, then, that the agent’s degree of belief in
recurrence is appropriate given the available evidence.
Evidence here – as in many realistic applications – is multifarious. There are
clinical datasets detailing the clinical symptoms of past patients, genomic datasets
listing the presence of various molecular markers in past patients, scientiﬁc pa-
pers supporting particular causal claims or associations, medical experts’ causal
knowledge, and information in medical informatics systems, including medical on-
tologies, and previous decision support systems such as argumentationsystems.
In [18] we had the following sources of evidence available. First, we had a clini-
cal dataset, namely the SEER study, which involves three million patients in the US
from1975–2003,including4,731breastcancer patients. We also hadtwo molecular
datasets, one with 502 cases and another with 119 cases; the latter dataset also mea-
sured some clinical variables. Finally, we had a published study which established
a causal relationship between two variables of interest.
These evidence sources impose constraints on an agent’s degrees of belief, as
outlined earlier. The agent’s degrees of belief should match the dataset distributions
on their respective domains. Moreover,degreesof belief should respect the equality
constraints imposed by knowledge of causal inﬂuence. While the Probability norm
holds that the strengths of the agent’s beliefs should be representable by a probabil-
ity function, the Calibration norm holds that this probability function should satisfy
the constraints imposed by evidence.
These two norms narrow down the choice of belief function to a set of prob-
ability functions. But objective Bayesian epistemology imposes a further norm,
Equivocation. Accordingly, the agent’s degrees of belief should be representable
by a probability function from within this set that is maximally equivocal. On a ﬁ-
nite domain, this turns out to be the (unique) probability function in this set that has
maximumentropy.So,objectiveBayesianepistemologyrecommendsthattreatment
decisions be based on this maximum entropy probability function.
As discussed in Sect.5, from a computational point of view it is natural to rep-
resent a probability function by a Bayesian net. A Bayesian net that represents a
probability function that is deemed appropriate by objective Bayesian epistemol-
ogy is called an objective Bayesian net [19]. This Bayesian net can be used for
inference – in our case to calculate degree to which one ought to believe that the
patient’s cancer will recur. Figure 2 depicts the graph of the objective Bayesian net
in our cancer application. At the top is the recurrence node, beneath which are clin-
ical variables. These are connected to ﬁve molecular variables at the bottom of the
graph. Hence, one can use both molecular markers and clinical symptoms to predict88 J. Williamson
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Fig. 2 Graph of an objective Bayesian net for breast cancer prognosis
the patient’s survival, even though no dataset contains information about all these
variables together. The objective Bayesian net model succeeds in integrating rather
disparate evidence sources.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Machine learning in general and automated scientiﬁc discovery in particular have
a close relationship with the philosophy of science. On the one hand, advances in
automated scientiﬁc discovery have lent plausibility to inductivist philosophy of
science. On the other hand, advances in probabilistic epistemology and work on
causality have improved the ability of machine learning methods to handle uncer-
tainty.
I have suggestedthat inductivismand falsiﬁcationism can be reconciledby view-
ingthese positionsasapproximationsto a thirdview ofscientiﬁc method,onewhich
considersthe fullrangeof evidencefora scientiﬁc hypothesis.This thirdway would
be an intriguing avenue of research for philosophyof science. I have also suggested
that the current single-dataset paradigm in machine learning is becoming increas-
ingly inapplicable,and that researchin machinelearningwould beneﬁt from serious
consideration of the problem of formulating a model on the basis of a broad range
of evidence. Bayesian epistemology may be a fruitful avenue of research for tack-
ling evidence integration in machine learning as well as evidence integration in the
philosophy of science.The Philosophy of Science and its relation to Machine Learning 89
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